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Detecting Adversarial Image Examples in Deep
Neural Networks with Adaptive Noise Reduction
Bin Liang, Hongcheng Li, Miaoqiang Su, Xirong Li, Wenchang Shi and Xiaofeng Wang
Abstract—Recently, many studies have demonstrated deep neural network (DNN) classifiers can be fooled by the adversarial
example, which is crafted via introducing some perturbations into an original sample. Accordingly, some powerful defense techniques
were proposed. However, existing defense techniques often require modifying the target model or depend on the prior knowledge of
attacks. In this paper, we propose a straightforward method for detecting adversarial image examples, which can be directly deployed
into unmodified off-the-shelf DNN models. We consider the perturbation to images as a kind of noise and introduce two classic image
processing techniques, scalar quantization and smoothing spatial filter, to reduce its effect. The image entropy is employed as a metric
to implement an adaptive noise reduction for different kinds of images. Consequently, the adversarial example can be effectively
detected by comparing the classification results of a given sample and its denoised version, without referring to any prior knowledge of
attacks. More than 20,000 adversarial examples against some state-of-the-art DNN models are used to evaluate the proposed method,
which are crafted with different attack techniques. The experiments show that our detection method can achieve a high overall F1 score
of 96.39% and certainly raises the bar for defense-aware attacks.
Index Terms—Adversarial example, deep neural network, detection
F
1 INTRODUCTION
D EEP neural networks (DNNs) [2] have been widelyadopted in many applications such as computer vi-
sion [4], [9], speech recognition [5], [6], and natural language
processing [7], [8]. DNNs have exhibited very impressive
performance in these tasks, especially in the image clas-
sification [9]. Some DNN-based classifiers achieved even
better performance than human [10], [11]. Meanwhile, their
robustness has also raised concerns.
Some recent studies [12], [13], [14] demonstrate that
DNN-based image classifiers can be fooled by adversarial
examples, which are well-crafted to cause a trained model
to misclassify. For example, as presented in [12], added
with some imperceptible perturbations, an image can be
misclassified with very high confidence by GoogLeNet [9],
while a human observer can still correctly classify it without
noticing the existence of the introduced perturbations. These
studies indicate that the adversaries could potentially use
the crafted image to inflict serious damages. As shown
in [15], a stop sign, after being crafted, will be incorrectly
classified as a yield sign. As a result, a self-driving car
equipped with the DNN classifier may behave dangerously.
Some techniques have been proposed to defend ad-
versarial examples in DNNs [12], [16], [17], [18]. Most of
them require modifying the target model. For example, the
adversarial training is a straightforward defense technique
which uses as many adversarial examples as possible during
training process as a kind of regularization [12], [16], [17].
Papernot et al. [18] introduced a defense technique named
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defensive distillation. Two networks were trained as a distilla-
tion, where the first network produced probability vectors to
label the original dataset, while the other was trained using
the newly labeled dataset. As a result, the effectiveness of
adversarial examples can be substantially reduced. Several
very recent studies [19], [20], [21], [22] focus on detecting
adversarial examples directly. Similarly, these techniques
also require modifying the model or acquiring sufficient
adversarial examples, such as training new sub-models [19],
retraining a revised model as a detector using known adver-
sarial examples [20], performing a statistical test on a large
group of adversarial and benign examples [21], or training
the key detection parameter using a number of adversarial
examples and their corresponding benign ones [22].
Unfortunately, retraining an existing model or chang-
ing its architecture will introduce expensive training cost.
Generating appropriate adversarial examples for training
or statistical testing is also of high cost and depends on a
very comprehensive prior knowledge of various potential
adversarial techniques. Even worse, the attacker can craft
adversarial examples with the technique unknown to the
defender. In this case, the adversarial example has a good
chance to evade the classifier. Moreover, training a classifier
with an emerging attack technique would take some time.
There always is a window for attackers to craft effectual
adversarial examples. Furthermore, most of existing defense
techniques are model-specific. To apply a defense technique
to different models, they need to be rebuilt or retrained
individually. The security enhancement to a model cannot
be directly applied to other ones.1
To address the aforementioned challenges, we present in
this paper a new technique capable of effectively capturing
1. For the latest version of this paper, please referring to https://
ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8482346.
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Fig. 1: Very small perturbation can result in an effective
adversarial example for a color image.
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Fig. 2: Only large perturbation can produce an adversarial
example for a simple image.
adversarial examples, even in the absence of prior knowl-
edge about potential attacks.
Our approach is based upon the observation that to
make the adversarial change imperceptible, the perturbation
incurred by the adversarial examples typically needs to
be confined within a small range. This is important, since
otherwise, the example will be easily identified by human.
Consequently, the information introduced by the perturba-
tion should also be less than that of the original image. In
the proposed method, we treat the perturbation as a kind of
artificial noise and leverage the noise reduction techniques
to reduce its adversarial effect. If the effect is downgraded
properly, the denoised adversarial example will be classified
as a new class that is different from the adversarial target.
On the other hand, for the legitimate sample, the same
denoising operation will most likely just slightly changes
the image’s semantics, keeping it still within its original cat-
egory. Intuitively, all the adversarial perturbation is added
later on to the image and therefore tends to less tolerant
of the noise reduction process than the original image in-
formation. The information remaining in a denoised benign
sample can be still enough for the classifier to correctly iden-
tify its class. In fact, some studies [23], [25] have shown that
the state-of-the-art classifiers are somewhat robust against
certain degree of distortions. To this end, the adversarial
example can be effectively detected by inspecting whether
the classification of a sample is changed after it is denoised.
Two classic image processing techniques, scalar quantiza-
tion and smoothing spatial filter, are leveraged to reduce the
effect of perturbations. However, it is actually inappropriate
to denoise all samples in the same way. A simple image, e.g.,
a grayscale handwritten digit, may only consist of hundreds
of pixels. In other words, the perturbation space is limited
when generating an adversarial example for this kind of
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Fig. 3: Detection Framework.
image. The adversary have to magnify the perturbation to
generate an effective adversarial example [12]. On the other
hand, a color photo can often provide a larger pertubation
space. Adding a small scale pertubation can make it be
misclassified. As Fig. 1 illustrates, manipulating a color
image with very small perturbation can generate an effective
adversarial example with the attack method in [12]. How-
ever, using the same strength perturbation fails to generate
adversarial example for a handwriting digit, as Fig. 2 shows.
Only when we magnify the perturbation to at least 50 times,
can we get an effective adversarial example. As a result,
the quantization or smoothing suitable for a high-resolution
sample may not be enough for a low-resolution one. Using
a uniform noise reduction strategy may over-denoise some
samples or under-denoise some others, and introduce false
positives and negatives. Obviously, we should employ dif-
ferent denoising strategies for different images.
To improve the generality of our method for different
kinds of images, an adaptive noise reduction is enforced.
The entropy of the image is utilized to measure the com-
plexity of samples. An aggressive noise reduction strategy
is adopted for the sample with a low entropy, which may be
perturbed heavily by the adversary. For high-entropy sam-
ples, a light strategy is employed. Specifically, as illustrated
in Fig. 3, the key component of our method is a detection
filter T. When feeding a sample x to the target classifier C,
it will be denoised by T to generate a filtered sample T(x).
The sample is first quantized with an appropriate interval
size, which is determined by computing the entropy of the
sample. We also use the entropy to decide whether the
quantized sample needs to be smoothed. Only when the
entropy is larger than a threshold, will it be smoothed by
a spatial smoothing filter. Finally, two individual classifica-
tions are performed. The one is for the original sample x,
and the other is for the denoised sample T(x). Only when
the two classifications are equal, i.e., C(x) == C(T(x)), will x
be considered benign. Otherwise, it is identified adversarial.
In practice, the detection mechanism cannot know the true
class of x in advance to validate its current classification
C(x). In our method, C(T(x)) actually acts as a detection
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baseline to detect potential adversarial examples.
We employ some state-of-the-art DNN models and
popular datasets, such as GoogLeNet [9], CaffeNet [26],
MNIST [27] and ImageNet [28] to evaluate the effectiveness
of the proposed method. Three up-to-date attack techniques,
i.e., FGSM [12], DeepFool [13], and CW attacks [29], are used
to craft adversarial examples. We evaluate our method in
two attack scenarios, namely, defense-unaware and defense-
aware. In the defense-unaware scenario, we generated 21,673
effectual adversarial examples in total. The experiments
show that the proposed method can achieve an overall recall
of 95.00% and an overall precision of 97.81% for detecting
the adversarial examples, resulting in a high overall F1
score [31] of 96.39%. Compared with other recent detection
methods, our method can detect more adversarial examples
with fewer false positives. In the defense-aware scenario, the
experiments show that our detection method can effectively
raise the bar for adversaries, the attack success rate is re-
markably downgraded to 67.37%. As demonstrated in [30],
many recent detection methods are defeated by defense-
aware attacks. In contrast, the proposed method is proven
to be a promising mitigation to defense-aware attacks.
In summary, our main contributions are the following.
• We model the perturbation of the DNN adversarial
examples as image noise and introduce classic image
processing techniques to reduce its effect. This allow
us to effectively detect adversarial examples without
prior knowledge of attack techniques.
• We employ the entropy to automatically adjust the
detection strategy for a specific sample. This makes
the proposed method capable of detecting different
kinds of adversarial examples without requiring tun-
ing its parameters, and can be directly integrated into
unmodified target models.
• Using some state-of-the-art DNN models, we
demonstrate that the proposed method can effec-
tively detect the adversarial examples generated by
different attack techniques with a better performance
than other recent detection method, especially in the
defense-aware attack scenario.2
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide some preliminaries on attack
scenarios and the attack techniques used in our experiments.
2.1 Attack Scenarios
In practice, the adversaries may possess different levels of
knowledge of target models. Accordingly, they may adopt
different methodologies when launching attacks. Similarly
as done in [?], [22], [30], we evaluate our detection method
in two different attack scenarios, i.e., defense-unaware and
defense-aware.
Defense-unaware Scenario. As discussed in [?], more
and more well-trained DNN models can be obtained from
online markets (e.g., Caffe Model Zoo). Some users may
directly employ such public models in their tasks [?], [?]. For
2. The source code of our detection method, along with the
experiment data, is all available at https://github.com/OwenSec/
DeepDetector.
example, Esteva et al. [?] utilized a pre-trained Inception v3
model and retrained it on some clinical images to classify
skin cancers. Both the original model and the retraining
samples are publicly available. In other words, the adver-
sary can also directly get the target model or build a same
one and thoroughly analyze it. However, as illustrated in
Fig. 3, the proposed technique can be easily deployed on
an unchanged trained model. The key component of the
proposed technique is a filter T, which can be directly
integrated with an original model C without requiring any
modification to it. In fact, the user can stealthily introduce
our detection technique in a public model. In this scenario,
the adversary can completely understand C but has no idea
about the existence of T (i.e., defense-unaware).
Defense-aware Scenario. In some extreme cases, the
adversaries can by all means get the whole target model, in-
cluding the integrated detection mechanism. Consequently,
they can fully analyze both C and T to generate desired ad-
versarial examples and launch more sophisticated attacks.
2.2 Crafting Adversarial Example
Szegedy et al. [14] first made the intriguing discovery that
various machine learning models, including DNNs [32], are
vulnerable to adversarial examples. In general, for a given
sample x and a trained model C, the attacker aims to craft an
adversarial example x∗ = x + ∆x by adding a perturbation
∆x to x, such that C(x*) 6= C(x).
In most of the cases, the attacker wants the target model
to misclassify the resultant image, while a human observer
can still correctly classify it without noticing the existence
of the introduced perturbation. In practice, the adversarial
examples can be generated straightforwardly [12] or with
an optimization procedure [13], [14], [29]. In this paper, we
choose the following three up-to-date attack techniques to
perform detection experiments. They can produce imper-
ceptible perturbations.
Fast Gradient Sign Method. Goodfellow et al. [12]
proposed a straightforward strategy named fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) to craft adversarial examples against
GoogLeNet [9]. The method is easy to implement and can
compute adversarial perturbations very efficiently. Let c be
the true class of x and J (C, x, c) be the cost function used to
train the DNN C. The perturbation is computed as the sign
of the model’s cost function gradient, i.e.
∆x = ε sign(5x J (C, x, c)) (1)
where ε (ranging from 0.0 to 1.0) is set to be small enough
to make ∆x undetectable. Choosing a small ε can produce
a well-disguised adversarial example. The change to the
original image is difficult to be spotted by a human. On
the contrary, a large ε is likely to introduce noticeable
perturbations but can get more adversarial examples when
the original images are simple (e.g., handwritten digits).
In the classic FGSM algorithm, all input pixels are
applied either a positive or negative change in the same
degree according to the direction (sign) of corresponding
cost gradients. However, as illustrated in Fig. 4, we found
that only manipulating the 30,000 (19.92%) input pixels with
the highest positive or negative gradient magnitude can also
generate an effectual adversarial example using the same ε.
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Fig. 4: Only manipulating the pixels with top gradients can
still result in effectual adversarial examples.
The result implies that we can’t assume the perturbation
follows some kind of distribution.
DeepFool. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [13] devised the
DeepFool algorithm to find very small perturbations that
are sufficient to change the classification result. The original
image x0 is manipulated iteratively. At each iteration of the
algorithm, the perturbation vector for xi that reaches the
decision boundary is computed, and the current estimate is
updated. The algorithm stops until the predicted class of
xi changes. DeepFool is implemented as an optimization
procedure which can yield a good approximation of the
minimal perturbation. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. performed
some attack experiments against several DNN image clas-
sifiers, such as GoogLeNet [9] and CaffeNet [26], and so on.
Their experiments demonstrated that DeepFool can lead to
a smaller perturbation than FGSM, which however is still
effective to trick the target models.
CW Attacks. Carlini and Wagner [29] also employed
an optimization algorithm to seek as small as possible
perturbations. Three powerful attacks (CW attacks for short)
are designed for the L0, L2, and L∞ distance metrics. Us-
ing some public datasets, such as MNIST [27] and Im-
ageNet [28], they trained some deep network models to
evaluate their attack methods. As demonstrated in [29], CW
attacks can find closer adversarial examples than the other
attack techniques and never fail to find an adversarial exam-
ple. For example, CW L0 and L2 attacks can find adversarial
examples with at least 2 times lower distortion than FGSM.
Besides, Carlini and Wagner also illustrated their attacks can
effectively break the defensive distillation [18].
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Overview
The basic idea behind our method is to regard the pertur-
bation as a kind of noise and introduce image processing
techniques to reduce its adversarial effect as far as possible.
As described in Section 2, an adversarial example is
crafted by superimposing some perturbations on the orig-
inal image. In this sense, the perturbation introduced in the
adversarial example is an additive noise item η(m, n), and
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the adversarial example can be considered as a degraded
image g(m, n) of the original image f (m, n) as follows,
g(m, n) = f(m, n) + η(m, n) (2)
where m and n are spatial coordinates, and f, g and η are
the functions mapping a pixel of coordinate (m, n) to its
intensity.
For example, the perturbation of an FGSM adversarial
example can be viewed as an additive noise whose ampli-
tude is ε. Ideally, if we can reconstruct the original image
f (m, n) from an adversarial example g(m, n), adversarial
examples can be detected immediately. However, achieving
this is very difficult, if not impossible, due to lack of the
necessary knowledge about the noise term η(m, n). Instead,
we seek to reconstruct the original image in the sense of
classification. Namely, we want to convert g(m, n) to a new
image f ’(m, n) such that its predicted class C(f ’(m, n)) can be
the same as C(f (m, n)).
Naturally, we hope that the model can correctly identify
a benign sample after the conversion. If so, the adversarial
example can be detected by checking whether the classifica-
tion of a sample is changed. If the classification is changed,
the sample will be identified as a potential adversarial
example. Otherwise, it is considered benign. Fortunately, the
state-of-the-art DNN image classifiers are robust to some ex-
tent and can tolerate a certain degree of distortion [23], [25],
although they are weak when facing adversarial examples.
As Fig. 5 illustrates, the original image is classified as Zebra
by GoogLeNet with 99.97% confidence. After being either
grayed, resized, compressed or blurred, it will still be correctly
classified with high confidence.
As mentioned in Section 1, the noise reduction tech-
niques are leveraged to reduce the effect of the perturbation.
Based on the above discussions, we believe that although
some details of interest in the sample may be removed
too, the classifiers can output the correct classification for
a denoised image. Note that, though the perturbation is
treated as a kind of noise in this study, we cannot imply that
the perturbation follows certain distributions. As presented
in [13], the perturbation may differ largely from one attack
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to another. This makes identifying them a nontrivial work.
Moreover, in real-life scenarios, we are unlikely to know
what technique the adversary uses and what features the
perturbation may possess. In fact, the introduced perturba-
tion can be random and there is not a predictable distri-
bution about them, as illustrated in Fig. 4. For this reason,
rather than the prior knowledge-based techniques (e.g. Lee
filtering [33]), we adopt two straightforward techniques that
require no prior knowledge, namely scalar quantization and
smoothing spatial filter, to detect adversarial examples.
For scalar quantization, the size of intervals is a key
parameter. In principle, using large intervals can more ef-
fectively reduce the effect of the perturbation but introduce
more distortions at the same time, and the “business” of an
image is damaged more heavily. This may result in a mis-
classification for a quantized benign sample, and produce a
false positive. On the contrary, smaller intervals may bring
more false negatives due to inadequate noise reduction.
We utilize the image entropy to determine the parameter.
The concept of image entropy describes how much random-
ness (or uncertainty) an image possesses, in other words,
how much information is provided by the image [34].
The entropy value of an image is a quantitative measure
of the information transmitted by the image. Commonly,
the higher the entropy of an image is, the richer its se-
mantics (“business”) often is. Consequently, for an image
with higher entropy, more information is required for the
classifier to identify its class. Based on the intuition, to avoid
excessively eliminating the information of a sample, a small
interval size will be applied to the high-entropy samples
when quantizing them. Accordingly, the low-entropy sam-
ples will be assigned with a large interval size.
Smoothing a sample will blur its details and often
decrease its information. However, for a very simple im-
age (with a low entropy), e.g., a handwritten digit, the
smoothing may excessively eliminate its details, which are
important to the classification task. Namely, the low-entropy
image can’t tolerate the blurring well from the perspective
of classification. To this end, we use the entropy to decide
whether the sample needs to be smoothed.
3.2 Evaluation Targets and Metrics
Target Models and Datasets. According to the three attack
techniques presented in Section 2, we do our best to collect
five available target models to explore the effectiveness of
the proposed method. As shown in Table 1, the models
cover all three attack techniques and refer to two datasets,
MNIST [27] and ImageNet [28]. MNIST is a dataset of simple
gray handwritten digits, while ImageNet is a large-scale
dataset of labeled high-resolution images. We select the
whole MINIST test dataset (10,000 digits) and seven classes
of images (3,730 samples) of ImageNet for evaluation.
To prevent over-fitting, we determine hyper-parameters
in a cross validation way. As listed in Table 2, these samples
are divided into three parts, training set, validation set and test
set. The training set is used to determine various detection
parameters (e.g., the interval size, the entropy threshold, the
choice of spatial smoothing filter, etc.), and the validation
set is leveraged to verify whether the selected parameter
setting is indeed effective. Besides, we only employ FGSM
TABLE 1: Target models.
Model Dataset Attack
M1 [35] MNIST FGSM
M2 [36] MNIST CW
CaffeNet [37] ImageNet DeepFool
GoogLeNet [37] ImageNet FGSM, DeepFool
Inception v3 [36] ImageNet CW
TABLE 2: Target datasets.
Dataset Training Validation Test
MNIST No. 0∼4499 No. 4500∼5499 No. 5500∼9999
ImageNet
Goldfish (648) Zebra (503)
Pineapple (520) Jellyfish (618) Panda (501)
Clock (455) Cab (485)
attack method in the parameter training phase, and the ε
value is fixed to 0.2 for MNIST and 1/255 for ImageNet.
After the parameters are determined, we will evaluate the
performance of our method against all the three attack
techniques on the test set.
Evaluation Metrics. To explore some hyper-parameters
of our method and evaluate the effectiveness, we adopt the
recall rate, the precision rate and the F1 score [31] to quantify
the detection performance, which are defined as follows,
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(3)
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(4)
F1 = 2 ∗ Recall ∗ Precision
Recall + Precision
(5)
where TP is the number of correctly detected adversarial
examples (true positives), FN the number of adversarial
examples that survive from our detection (false negatives),
and FP the number of benign images that are detected as
adversarial examples (false positives). The higher F1 score
indicates the better overall detection performance. Ideally, if
the method can detect all the adversarial examples without
introducing any false positives, the F1 score will be 1.0.
Besides, to evaluate the capability of recovering the orig-
inal classification of adversarial examples via our detection
filter, we introduce a new metric RTP (short for Recovered
True Positives). RTP indicates the number of such samples,
which are successfully detected as adversarial and its fil-
tered version can be correctly classified as its original class.
3.3 Computing Entropy
Our preliminary experiments indicate that the input image
itself is also a parameter of determining effectual detec-
tion scheme. In other words, the scheme that works well
on detecting low-resolution adversarial images may fail
detecting high-resolution ones. In this work, we leverage
the discrete entropy to distinguish images with different
resolutions. Discrete entropy [38] is a powerful metric and
has been proven useful in image processing [39], [40], [41].
Without loss of generality, for an M×N grayscale image with
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TABLE 3: Uniform vs. non-uniform quantization.
Quantization Time (s) Recall Precision F1
Uniform 0.004 94.00% 100.00% 96.91%
Non-uniform 137.7 94.00% 51.65% 66.67%
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Fig. 6: Different filter masks with size 5× 5.
256 pixel levels (0∼255), its entropy can be computed as
equation (7). The frequency of pixel level i is denoted as fi.
pi = fi / (M ×N) i = 0, 1, ..., 255 (6)
H = −
255∑
i=0
pilog2(pi) (7)
For a RGB color image, its entropy is the average of the
entropies of its three color planes.
3.4 Scalar Quantization
Quantization is the process of representing a large (possibly
infinite) set of values with a smaller (finite) one, e.g., map-
ping the real numbers to the integers. In image processing,
quantization is often employed as a lossy compression tech-
nique by mapping a range of pixel intensities to a single
representing one. In other words, reducing the number of
colors of an image to cut its file size.
Scalar quantization is the most practical and straightfor-
ward approach to quantize an image. In scalar quantization,
all inputs within a specified interval are mapped to a com-
mon value (called codeword), and the inputs in a different
interval will be mapped to a different codeword. There are
two types of scalar quantization, uniform quantization and
non-uniform quantization [42]. In uniform quantization, the
input will be separated into the same size intervals, while in
non-uniform quantization, the intervals are usually of differ-
ent sizes chosen with an optimization algorithm to minimize
the distortion [43], [44]. A small-scale empirical study is
performed on 100 MNIST digits with FGSM attack to decide
which type of quantization can more effectively downgrade
the effect of the perturbation. We adopt the algorithm in
[43] to perform non-uniform quantization. The number of
intervals is set to two for both uniform and non-uniform
quantization. As Table 3 shows, uniform quantization can
achieve much higher F1 score in detection and spend much
less time. Therefore, in this study, we employ the uniform
quantization technique to handle the sample.
To develop a uniform quantization, we also need to
determine the number of intervals. We tried to use the sam-
ples of the training set to discover an appropriate interval
number. Unfortunately, from the experiment results shown
in Table 4, we can see that there is not a general interval
setting for different samples. The best F1 score 96.43% for
detecting MNIST adversarial examples is achieved under
two-interval setting. However, for ImageNet examples, the
best score 88.11% is got when using six-interval. To tackle
this problem, we leverage the image entropy described in
Section 3.3 to automatically apply an adaptive interval size
for a given sample. We conduct a series of experiments on
the training set to seek some entropy thresholds, which will
be used to set the interval size. Finally, as shown in Table 5,
we find a practicable solution. The number of intervals is set
to two, four and six for the samples with different entropies
(smaller than 4.0, between 4.0 and 5.0, and larger than
5.0) respectively. As Table 6 presents, the cross validation
experiments also show that the adaptive scalar quantization
strategy can achieve satisfying detection performance on
both training and validation set.
However, the experiments also show that there is still
room to improve the detection performance on high-entropy
(larger than 5.0) samples. The F1 score is 85.80% for high-
entropy samples but 95.68% for the others. In essence, scalar
quantization is a kind of point operation. Subsequently, we
further reduce perturbation for high-entropy samples by
introducing the neighborhood operation technique. As Table
5 presents, we also use the entropy to determine whether
the smoothing should be performed.
3.5 Spatial Smoothing Filter
The spatial smoothing filter is one of the most classic tech-
niques for noise reduction. The idea behind it is to modify
the value of the pixels in an image based on a local neigh-
borhood of the pixels. As a result, the sharp transitions in
pixel intensities, often brought by noise, are reduced in the
target image. In linear smoothing filtering, the filtered image
f ’(m, n) is the convolution of the original image f (m, n) with
a filter mask w(m, n) as follows.
f ′(m, n) = (w∗f )(m, n) =
a∑
s=-a
b∑
t=-b
w (s, t) f (m−s, n−t) (8)
The filter mask determines the smoothing effect. Fig. 6
presents three common 5×5 averaging filter masks. With a
mask, the intensity of a pixel is replaced with the standard
average of the intensities of the pixels which are weighted
by 1 in its neighborhood. After filtered, the target image is
blurred and small details are removed from it. However,
from the viewpoint of image classification, the objects of
interest may be highlighted and easy to detect.
To determine a practicable filter, we conduct a number of
experiments with different shape and size of masks on the
2,015 high-entropy training samples. From the results listed
in Table 7, it can be concluded that there are five acceptable
candidates, i.e., 5 × 5 cross, 7 × 7 cross, 5 × 5 diamond,
7 × 7 diamond, and 5 × 5 box masks. The cross validation
experiments (see Table 8) also indicate that these five masks
are effective on our validation set. In the next subsection,
we will present the complete detection filter based on scalar
quantization and spatial smoothing.
3.6 Detection Filter
In practice, the smoothing may bring an excessive blurring
to some samples and produce new false positives. To this
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TABLE 4: Performance of detecting FGSM adversarial examples with different scalar quantization schemes.
Dataset Metric
Number of Intervals
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
MNIST
Recall 93.86% 86.48% 93.04% 13.26% 7.25% 24.95% 42.03% 50.62% 52.35%
Precision 99.14% 99.66% 99.90% 99.51% 99.11% 99.74% 99.77% 100.00% 100.00%
F1 Score 96.43% 92.60% 96.35% 23.40% 13.51% 39.92% 59.15% 67.22% 68.72%
ImageNet
Recall 94.35% 93.07% 91.26% 86.59% 85.15% 80.71% 76.56% 68.50% 66.84%
Precision 57.51% 72.14% 82.05% 88.32% 91.28% 93.54% 94.60% 94.79% 95.27%
F1 Score 71.46% 81.28% 86.41% 87.44% 88.11% 86.65% 84.63% 79.53% 78.57%
TABLE 5: The denoising strategies for different entropies.
Entropy Quantization Intervals Smoothing?
<4 2 NO
4 ∼5 4 NO
>5 6 YES
TABLE 6: Detection performance of the adaptive quantiza-
tion strategy.
Dataset TP FN FP Recall Precision F1 Score
Training 3482 370 146 90.39% 95.98% 93.10%
Validation 939 81 48 92.06% 95.14% 93.57%
end, we design a combination filter based on the two above
techniques rather than simply concatenating them together.
As discussed in Section 2, the attacker often wants the
perturbation introduced in the adversarial example as small
as possible to make it imperceptible. In other words, the
perturbation to the pixel intensity is often limited in a small
range. If the intensity of a pixel is blurred too much by the
smoothing filter, the smoothing might be unnecessary. Based
on the above intuition, our detection filter for high-entropy
samples is defined by the following equation, f ’(m,n) =
fSQ(m, n), if | fSQ(m, n)− f(m, n) |
≤ | fSQ−SF (m, n)− f(m, n) |
fSQ−SF (m, n), else
(9)
where fSQ(m, n) is the quantized original image and
fSQ−SF (m, n) is the smoothed quantized image. For a given
pixel (a, b) of the input sample f (m, n), the output pixel
value f ’(a, b) will be replaced with its quantization fSQ(a,
b) when the distance between the quantization fSQ(a, b)
and the original pixel value f (a, b) is smaller than the one
between fSQ−SF (a, b) and f (a, b); otherwise, it will be set to
fSQ−SF (a, b).
The complete framework of our detection method is
ready now. In the first place, the image entropy is lever-
aged to automatically adjust detection parameters for each
sample. For low-entropy (smaller than 4.0) and mid-entropy
(between 4.0 and 5.0) samples, we only apply two-interval
and four-interval uniform quantization to them respectively;
for high-entropy (larger than 5.0) samples, we first quantize
them with six-interval quantization, and then smooth their
quantized version as illustrated in Equation 9. To determine
the final smoothing filter from the five candidates, we con-
duct a series of experiments and find that 7×7 cross mask is
the best one when integrating it with scalar quantization. As
Table 9 shows, the final detection filter can achieve satisfying
detection performance on both training and validation set.
Note that the proposed method is transparent to the
target model. In practice, the detection filter can be directly
integrated with any off-the-shelf model as a sample prepro-
cessor. The target model can be kept unchanged.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the proposed method on our test
set, consisting of 4,500 MNIST digits and 1,489 ImageNet
images of three classes (Zebra, Panda and Cab). Addition-
ally, all the three attack techniques, i.e., FGSM, DeepFool
and CW, are employed to inspect the effectiveness of our
method. It should be pointed out that all the test samples
and the latter two attack techniques (DeepFool and CW) are
not involved in the design phase of our method. As men-
tioned in Section 1, the proposed method will be evaluated
in in both defense-unaware and defense-aware scenarios.
4.1 Defense-unaware Attack Detection
In the defense-unaware scenario, the adversary is ignorant
of the proposed method, and can only generate adversarial
examples on the original model.
4.1.1 Detecting FGSM Examples
For FGSM attack, the ε value is an important and adjustable
parameter. In general, the larger the ε is, the more adver-
sarial examples FGSM can successfully crafted. However,
an excessive ε is likely to introduce noticeable perturba-
tion and be easily spotted by a human. To evaluate the
capability of our method for detecting adversarial examples
with different magnitudes of perturbations, the adversarial
examples are crafted with some acceptable ε values. It is set
between 0.1 to 0.4 for MNIST digits and 1/255 or 2/255
for ImageNet images. As listed in Table 10 (rows 1∼6),
the proposed method can achieve an average F1 score of
95.37% in detecting all FGSM examples. Surprisingly, the
classifications of 94.16% adversarial images can be correctly
recovered by the detection filter. Note that, the detection
performance is obtained without using any prior knowledge
about adversarial examples.
4.1.2 Detecting DeepFool Examples
We use the algorithm provided in [45] to generate DeepFool
examples against GoogLeNet and CaffeNet [37]. The detec-
tion performance is presented in Table 10 (rows 7 and 8). Al-
though DeepFool can produce a smaller perturbation than
FGSM, the proposed method is still effective. Specifically,
8 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, MANUSCRIPT ID
TABLE 7: Performance of detecting high-entropy FGSM adversarial examples with different spatial smoothing filters.
Filter Mask
Cross Mask Diamond Mask Box Mask
3× 3 5× 5 7× 7 9× 9 3× 3 5× 5 7× 7 9× 9 3× 3 5× 5 7× 7 9× 9
Recall 56.43% 84.05% 90.03% 91.03% 56.34% 85.54% 90.93% 92.22% 74.18% 91.53% 92.12% 93.22%
Precision 90.85% 91.83% 86.00% 80.23% 90.85% 88.27% 81.57% 75.39% 88.15% 82.41% 74.28% 66.08%
F1 Score 69.62% 87.77% 87.97% 85.29% 69.62% 86.89% 86.00% 82.96% 80.56% 86.73% 82.24% 77.34%
TABLE 8: Performance of the five superior spatial smooth-
ing filters with the validation set.
Filter Mask
Cross Mask Diamond Mask Box Mask
5× 5 7× 7 5× 5 7× 7 5× 5
Recall 80.33% 84.78% 82.20% 87.12% 85.95%
Precision 90.74% 83.60% 86.67% 78.98% 80.48%
F1 Score 85.22% 84.19% 84.38% 82.85% 83.13%
TABLE 9: Performance of the proposed detection filter on
detecting FGSM adversarial examples.
Dataset TP FN FP Recall Precision F1
Training 3324 266 108 92.59% 96.85% 94.67%
Validation 1028 61 35 94.40% 96.71% 95.54%
the proposed method can achieve high F1 scores of 93.85%
and 95.95% with respect to GoogLeNet and CaffeNet, re-
spectively. Besides, the classifications of 95.02% DeepFool
examples can be successfully recovered by our filter.
4.1.3 Detecting CW Examples
Among the three techniques, CW attack is the strongest one.
It is an optimization-based algorithm which can seek out
as small as possible perturbations. Carlini and Wagner [29]
demonstrated that CW attack can find closer adversarial
examples than the other attack techniques. For example, CW
L2 attack can find adversarial examples with at least two
times lower distortion than FGSM. Besides, they proved that
CW attack can craft adversarial examples with very high
success rate. The #F column of Table 10 further demonstrates
the statement.
In the experiments, we employ CW L2 and L∞ attack
to generate well-disguised adversarial examples to evaluate
our method. However, CW attack is much more expensive
than other attack techniques. Generating an ImageNet ad-
versarial example with L2 and L∞ can take about 5 and 40
minutes respectively. For this reason, we only picked the last
1,000 MNIST digits and 100 randomly selected ImageNet
images from the test set as experiment dataset.
CW L2 attack can generate adversarial examples un-
der various confidences. To comprehensively evaluate our
method, when generating L2 examples, we use different κ
values [29] to control the confidence of generated examples.
When κ = 0.0, the adversarial examples will be with low-
confidence. As κ increases, the confidence will increase
accordingly. In the experiments, we set κ to 0.0, 0.5, 1.0,
2.0 and 4.0, and generate L2 examples with confidence from
about 50% to over 90%. As listed in Table 10 (rows 9∼20),
our method illustrates excellent detection performance. It
can achieve an average F1 score of 98.80%. In addition,
the classifications of 93.94% CW examples can be recov-
ered successfully. By the way, detecting a sample with the
proposed method only takes less than one second. The
introduced overhead is totally negligible compared with the
time consumption of generating a CW example.
4.1.4 The Proposed Method vs. Other Detections
Recently, Carlini and Wagner [30] presented a very compre-
hensive survey on the effectiveness of detection methods.
They collect ten recent detection methods they could find
and re-implemented seven of them, which didn’t release any
source code. The CW L2 attack algorithm was employed to
craft adversarial examples to test the methods under differ-
ent attack scenarios. Their study involved a great amount of
work and provided a solid basis for estimate our detection
method. In this study, we follow the methodology of Car-
lini and Wagner [30] and leverage their result to compare
our method with related ones in the defense-unaware and
defense-aware scenarios.
One [20] of the ten methods is other type of detection
and beyond the scope of this paper. All the rest nine
ones are used in the comparison. As listed in the second
column of Table 11, five target detection methods [19], [21],
[47], [48], [49] can effectively detect adversarial examples
under defense-unaware scenario. Carlini and Wagner [30]
provided exact recall rates for three of them [21], [48],
[49]. However, the other two target methods [19], [46] are
less effective and cannot achieve a high recall rate. The
remaining two [21], [46] have been proven to be ineffective
when facing CW L2 attack.
We adopt the same configurations as [30], i.e., using the
default κ value setting (0.0), to generate L2 examples. The
detection performance of our method is presented in Table
10 (row 9). Our method can achieve a high recall rate of
98.89% and a low false positive rate of 0.90%. Compared
with the existing methods, we can conclude that our method
outperforms them in the defense-unaware scenario.
4.2 Defense-aware Attack detection
In the defense-aware scenario, the adversary knows the
technique details of the detection method. When launching
an attack, he or she can leverage the knowledge to fool the
classifier as well as the detector. As done in [30], we launch
a defense-aware CW L2 attack on 1,000 MNIST test samples.
Specifically, to evade our detection, the adversary needs
to generate an adversarial example x, which satisfies the
constraint C(x) == C(T(x)). We modify the original CW L2
algorithm to get such examples. The constraint is introduced
in the iteration of seeking an effectual adversarial example.
This ensures the output image of every optimization and
its denoised version are classified as the same thing. If the
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TABLE 10: Detection results of the proposed method. #F denotes the number of images that cannot be perturbed to
adversarial ones.
No. Attack/Model Dataset #F TP FN FP RTP RTP% Recall Precision F1
1 FGSM (ε=0.1)/M1 MNIST 4026 410 40 24 398 97.07% 91.11% 94.47% 92.76%
2 FGSM (ε=0.2)/M1 MNIST 1910 2467 106 32 2430 98.50% 95.88% 98.72% 97.28%
3 FGSM (ε=0.3)/M1 MNIST 455 3856 172 32 3768 97.71% 95.73% 99.18% 97.42%
4 FGSM (ε=0.4)/M1 MNIST 132 4078 273 32 3820 93.67% 93.73% 99.22% 96.40%
5 FGSM (ε=1/255)/GoogLeNet ImageNet 270 841 98 88 718 85.37% 89.56% 90.53% 90.04%
6 FGSM (ε=2/255)/GoogLeNet ImageNet 119 860 230 89 647 75.23% 78.90% 90.62% 84.36%
7 DeepFool/GoogLeNet ImageNet 405 725 42 53 690 95.17% 94.52% 93.19% 93.85%
8 DeepFool/CaffeNet ImageNet 96 900 29 47 854 94.89% 96.88% 95.04% 95.95%
9 CW L2 (κ=0.0)/M2 MNIST 0 984 11 9 919 93.39% 98.89% 99.09% 98.99%
10 CW L2 (κ=0.5)/M2 MNIST 0 984 11 9 920 93.50% 98.89% 99.09% 98.99%
11 CW L2 (κ=1.0)/M2 MNIST 0 983 12 9 913 92.88% 98.79% 99.09% 98.94%
12 CW L2 (κ=2.0)/M2 MNIST 0 979 16 9 897 91.62% 98.39% 99.09% 98.74%
13 CW L2 (κ=4.0)/M2 MNIST 0 959 36 9 866 90.30% 96.38% 99.07% 97.71%
14 CW L2 (κ=0.0)/Inception v3 ImageNet 2 98 0 8 91 92.86% 100% 92.45% 96.08%
15 CW L2 (κ=0.5)/Inception v3 ImageNet 0 100 0 2 98 98.00% 100% 98.04% 99.01.%
16 CW L2 (κ=1.0)/Inception v3 ImageNet 0 100 0 2 98 98.00% 100% 98.04% 99.01.%
17 CW L2 (κ=2.0)/Inception v3 ImageNet 0 100 0 2 98 98.00% 100% 98.04% 99.01.%
18 CW L2 (κ=4.0)/Inception v3 ImageNet 0 100 0 2 98 98.00% 100% 98.04% 99.01.%
19 CW L∞/M2 MNIST 0 991 7 1 991 100% 99.30% 99.90% 99.60%
20 CW L∞/Inception v3 ImageNet 25 75 0 2 73 97.33% 100.00% 97.40% 98.68%
Total/Average 7440 20590 1083 461 19387 94.16% 95.00% 97.81% 96.39%
TABLE 11: The proposed method vs. other detections.
Method
Defense-unaware Defense-aware
Detection Performance Attack Success?
MMD [21] “fails to detect” [30] -
Cascade
92.00% false positive -
Classifier [46]
Network
75.00% recall 98.00%
Uncertainty [19]
3× 3 Filter [46] 80.00% recall YES
KDE [19] “able to detect” [30] YES
PCA [47] “does detect” [30] YES
Dimensionality
97.00% recall YES
Reduction [48]
Adversarial
98.00% recall 100%
Training [49]
Adversarial
98.50% recall 100%
Retraining [21]
The proposed 98.89% recall
67.37%
method 0.90% false positive
algorithm can output an adversarial example successfully,
it will evade our detection method. The experiments show
that there are 32.63% of the samples cannot be perturbed
successfully to the target model equipped with our detec-
tion. In other words, the attack success rate is 67.37%.
Carlini and Wagner [30] also presented defense-aware
attack experiments for the seven detection methods except
the two that already fail in defense-unaware attacks. As
done in Section 4.1.4, we also use their results to make a
comparison with other methods. From the third column of
Table 11, we can see that three methods [19], [21], [49] be-
come completely ineffective. An adversary can successfully
generate adversarial examples for almost all of samples.
And all the other four methods [19], [46], [48], [49] are also
”broken” [30]. By comparison, our method can remarkably
downgrade the success rate from nearly 100% to 67.37%.
As discussed in [29] and [30], it is still an open problem
to construct defenses to defense-aware attacks. Based on the
above experiments, we believe that our method effectively
raises the bar for adversaries to launch successful attacks.
4.3 Summary
All in all, 43,346 samples are used to evaluate our method
in the defense-unaware experiments, half of them are ad-
versarial and half are benign. In detecting those adversar-
ial examples generated by the three attack techniques, we
achieve an overall recall of 95.00% and an overall precision
of 97.81%, resulting in a high overall F1 score of 96.39%.
Note that our detection method inevitably leads to some
false positives. For the 21,673 benign samples, our method
causes 461 samples (2.13%) to be misclassified, which is an
acceptable performance degradation in security critical sce-
narios. In addition, the classifications of 94.16% adversarial
examples can be recovered by the proposed filter.
In practice, it is very difficult to effectively detect
defense-aware attacks, as demonstrated in previous studies.
All existing detection methods were broken by defense-
aware CW attacks. As Section 4.2 shows, our method cer-
tainly raises the bar for adversaries, and is a promising
mitigation to defense-aware attacks.
Furthermore, our method can be deployed directly to
the target model without modifying or retraining it, and
even without any prior knowledge of attack techniques. In
fact, we only use FGSM algorithm for determining detection
filters, but the selected filter can effectively defeat the other
two much stronger attacks, i.e., DeepFool and CW.
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Fig. 7: A false positive caused by the ambiguous sample
5 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
False Positives and False Negatives. In principle, the
performance of our detection method is closely related to
the classification capacity of target classifiers. Some false
positives and false negatives are caused by the ambiguous
images, which are essentially hard to classify for the target
classifier. As shown in Fig. 7, an image consisting of various
fruits is labeled as Pineapple, but GoogLeNet can tell that
with only 19.55% confidence. This is really not a strong
prediction. The sample is also considered as a Lemon with
10.85% confidence and a Jackfruit 9.43%. After being de-
noised by our filter, the image is misclassified as Lemon and
results in a false positive. However, we think that neither
the model nor the proposed detection filter is to blame for
the false positive, but the ambiguity within the image is. The
confusing images cannot only result in false positives, but
also false negatives. Take an adversarial example generated
with FGSM as example, the image shown in Fig. 8 is per-
turbed from Pineapple to Sea Anemone but only with 19.76%
confidence. GoogLeNet gives a weak prediction for it. And
our detection method also fails to detect this adversarial
example and produces a false negative.
There are quite a few ambiguous images like the two
examples in our experiment set, which brings down the
precision rate as well as the recall rate. For the ambigu-
ous samples, inspecting more predict classes (e.g. top five
predictions) might be necessary rather than just the top one
with the highest confidence.
Perceptible Perturbations. Some attack techniques, such
as CW L0 [29] and Jacobian-based saliency map approach
(JSMA) [17], may introduce the large-amplitude perturba-
tion. Such attack techniques limit the number of altered
pixels, but not the amplitude of pixels. Consequently, as
illustrated in Fig. 9, the obtained adversarial example may
present easy-to-notice distortions. It can be easily spotted
by a human. However, it can still be exploited to launch an
effective attack when the human interaction is not in con-
sideration. Some other adversarial images with perceptible
perturbations can be found in [17]. In principle, it is very
difficult to properly reduce the effect of the heavy perturba-
tion only with the filtering technique without compromising
the semantics of the original image. To develop an effective
technique to detect this kind of example is beyond the scope
of this paper but will be our future research.
Other Image Processing Techniques. There are a num-
ber of other image processing techniques in addition to the
ones adopted in our method. Some of them may can be
leveraged to further improve our detection method, such as
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Fig. 9: A perceptible adversarial example generated with
CW L0 attack.
Re´nyi entropy [50], image segmentation [42], etc. For example,
we can segment an adversarial example into some regions
according to the connectivity among pixels to find such a
region that possesses as much as possible information. From
it, we have a good chance to restore the correct classification
when the perturbation is isolated in other regions. In this
way, the adversarial example shown in Fig. 9 may can be
detected. In the future, we plan to investigate other im-
age processing techniques to develop a more sophisticated
detection method, especially for detecting the adversarial
example with large-amplitude perturbations.
6 RELATED WORK
Many existing studies have paid much attention to the
security of classifiers, and the arm race between adversaries
and defenders will never end.
Attacks on Traditional Classifiers. Many studies have
investigated the security of traditional machine learning
methods [51] and proposed some attack methods. Lowd and
Meek conduct an attack that minimizes a cost function [52].
They further propose attacks against statistical spam filters
that add the words indicative of non-spam emails to spam
emails [53]. The same strategy is employed in [54]. In [55],
a methodology, called reverse mimicry, is designed to evade
structural PDF malware detection systems. In [56], an online
learning-based system, PDFRATE, was used as a case to
investigate the effectiveness of evasion attacks. The study
reconstructs a similar classifier through training one of the
publicly available datasets by a few deduced features, and
then evades PDFRATE by insertion of dummy content into
PDF files. In [57], an algorithm is proposed for evasion of
classifiers with differentiable discriminant functions. Liang
et al. [58] demonstrated that client-side classifiers are also
vulnerable to evasion attacks.
Xu et al. [59] presented a general approach to find
evasive variants by stochastically manipulate a malicious
sample seed. The experiments showed that the effectual
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variants can be automatically generated to against two PDF
malware classifiers, i.e., PDFRATE and Hidost.
Fredrikson et al. [60], [61] developed a new form of
model inversion attack which can infer sensitive features
used in decision tree models and recover images from some
facial recognition models by exploiting confidence values
revealed by the target models. The proposed attack may
cause serious privacy disclosure problems [60]. More model
inversion attacks can be found in [61].
Defenses for Traditional Classifiers. Many countermea-
sures against evasion attacks have been proposed, such as
using game theory [62], [63] or probabilistic models [64], [65]
to predict attack strategy to construct more robust classifiers,
employing multiple classifier systems (MCSs) [66], [67], [68]
to increase the difficulty of evasion, and optimizing feature
selection [69], [70] to make the features evenly distributed.
Game-theoretical approaches [62], [63] model the inter-
actions between the adversary and the classifier as a game.
The adversary’s goal is to evade detection by minimally
manipulating the attack instances, while the classifier is
retrained to correctly classify them.
MCSs [66], [67], [68], as the name suggests, uses multi-
ple classifiers rather than only one to improve classifier’s
robustness. The adversary who wants to effectively evade
the classification has to fight with more than one classifier.
Kantchelian et al. [71] present family-based ensembles
of classifiers. In particular, they trained an ensemble of
classifiers, one for each family of malware. By combining
classifications, it will be determined whether an unknown
binary is malware, and if it is, which family it belongs
to. What’s more, they also demonstrate the importance of
human operators in adversarial environments.
In [69], the method weight evenness via feature selection
optimization is proposed. By appropriate feature selection,
the weight of every feature is evenly distributed, thus the
adversary has to manipulate a larger number of features
to evade detection. In [70], the features are reweighted
inversely proportional to their corresponding importance,
making it difficult for the adversary to exploit the features.
Unfortunately, these attack and defense techniques for
traditional classifiers cannot be directly applied to DNNs.
Along with the prevalence of DNNs, researchers have begun
to pay close attention to the security of DNNs.
Attacks on DNNs. Recently, researchers have begun to
attack DNN-based classifiers through crafting adversarial
examples. There are various methods to generate adversar-
ial examples against DNNs in various fields, not limited
in computer vision [12], [13], [14], but also speech recogni-
tion [16], text classification [72] and malware detection [73].
Kereliuk et al. [16] proposed a method to craft ad-
versarial audio examples using the gradient information
of the model’s loss function. Through the application of
minor perturbations to the input magnitude spectra, they
can effectively craft an adversarial example. Text as discrete
data is sensitive to perturbation. Liang et al. [72] proposed
a method to craft adversarial text examples. Three pertur-
bation strategies, namely insertion, modification, and removal,
are designed to generate an adversarial example for a given
text. By computing the cost gradients, what should be
inserted, modified or removed, where to insert and how to
modify are determined effectively. By elaborately dressing a
text sample, the adversary can modify the classification to
any other classes while still keeps the meaning unchanged.
Grosse et al. [73] presented a method to craft adversarial
examples on neural networks for malware classification, by
adapting the method originally proposed in [17].
In this paper, we focus on the detection of adversarial
images. We believe that our method can be applied to
detect adversarial examples for audio, which is also a kind
of continuous data. But the proposed technique cannot
be applied to discrete data, such as the adversarial text
and malware. The new method need to be developed for
effectively detecting them.
Note that there are two recent studies focus on crafting
adversarial examples in the physical world. Kurakin et
al. [74] demonstrated that the adversarial images obtained
from a cell-phone camera can still fool an ImageNet clas-
sifier. Sharif et al. [75] presented an attack method to fool
facial biometric systems. They showed that with some well-
crafted eyeglass frames, a subject can dodge recognition or
impersonate others.
Besides, Shokri et al. [76] developed a novel black-
box membership inference attack against machine learning
models, including DNN and non-DNN models. Given a
data record, the attacker can determine whether it is in
the target model’s training dataset. For health-care datasets,
such information leakage is unacceptable.
Improve the Robustness of Deep Networks. The ad-
versarial training [12], [13], [16], [17], [77] is a straight-
forward defense technique to improve the robustness of
target models. Retraining models by adding as many as
possible adversarial examples can bring more challenges for
attackers to find new adversarial examples.
Wang et al. [78] integrated a data transformation module
right in front of a standard DNN to improve the model’s
resistance to adversarial examples. This data transformation
module leverages non-parametric dimensionality reduction
methods, and projects all the input samples into a new rep-
resentation before passing the inputs to the target DNN in
training and testing. Wang et al. [79] also proposed another
method, named random feature nullification, for construct-
ing adversary resistant DNNs. In particular, it randomly
nullifies or masks features within input samples in both
the training and testing phase. Such nullification makes a
DNN model non-deterministic and then improves model’s
resistance to adversarial examples.
The proposed method is compatible with the above
defense techniques. Defenders can still use our method in
the enhanced model to get a better performance.
Detection Techniques. Some studies also focus on de-
tecting adversarial examples directly.
Xu et al. in a very recent study [22] proposed a method,
called Feature Squeezing, to detect adversarial examples in
a similar way as ours. They explore two approaches to
squeeze the features of an image: reducing the color bit
depth of each pixel and smoothing it using a spatial fil-
ter. Their system identifies the adversarial examples by
measuring the disagreement among the prediction vectors
of the original and squeezed examples. Their experiments
illustrated high performance was achieved when detecting
FGSM adversarial examples in a MNIST model. However, a
predefined threshold is required for determining how much
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disagreement indicates the current sample is adversarial. In
their experiments, half of the examples are used to train the
threshold that can produce the best detection accuracy on
training examples. This means the defender must have a
sufficient number of adversarial examples generated with
potential attack techniques. As a result, the method works
well only when the attack technique is known but less
effective when facing unknown attacks. Moreover, in princi-
ple, for different datasets, models or attacks, the thresholds
need to be retrained to achieve acceptable performance. By
introducing the image entropy, we implement an adaptive
detection method and can be directly applied to different
models, datasets and attack techniques with the same set-
ting and without requiring any prior knowledge of attacks.
Grosse et al. [21] put forward a defense to detect adver-
sarial examples using statistical tests. The method requires
a sufficient large group of adversarial examples and benign
examples to estimate their data distribution. However, the
statistical test method cannot be directly applied to detect
individual examples, making it less useful in practice. For
this reason, Grosse et al. further propose a new method
by adding an additional class (e.g., adversarial class) to
the model’s output and retraining the model to classify
adversarial examples as the new class. Gong et al. [49]
proposed a similar adversarial retraining-based detection
method. In the method, they trained a binary model to
determine whether a given input is adversarial. Bhagoji et
al. [48] leveraged the principle component analysis (PCA)
technique to reduce the dimensionality of the images. Then
instead of training on the original images, they trained a
classifier on images which had been processed with di-
mensionality reduction. Hendrycks and Gimpel [47] used a
large number of adversarial examples to train a detector to
identify unknown adversarial examples. A small ”detector”
subnetwork is trained on the binary classification task of dis-
tinguishing benign samples from adversarial perturbations.
To a large extent, the performance of the above four
detection techniques [21], [47], [48], [49] also depends on
how much effectual adversarial examples are available.
Li et al. [46] built a cascade classifier and integrated the
classifier with the original model. By checking each output
of the original model’s inner convolutional layers, they can
determine whether a input sample is adversarial. Feinman
et al. [19] devised two novel features to detect adversar-
ial examples based on the idea that adversarial examples
deviate the true data manifold. They introduced density
estimates to measure the distance between an unknown
input sample and a set of benign samples. The method
is computationally expensive and may be less effective
in detecting adversarial examples which are very close to
benign samples.
In summary, compared with the above defense tech-
niques, our method possesses three advantages. First, our
method is adaptive. The detection strategy is automatically
adjusted for individual samples. The input image will be
suitably filtered according to its entropy before being fed
to the classifier. This improves the detection performance
greatly. Second, the method is not attack-specific and thus
holds great promise for detecting unknown attacks. As the
experiments demonstrated, the detection parameters tuned
with respect to a weaker attack (FGSM) is also applicable
to stronger attacks (DeepFool and CW). Finally, our method
is easier to deploy. The method can be directly integrated
with a trained model, without retraining or modifying the
model.
7 CONCLUSION
Many efforts have been paid to use various techniques to
defend or detect the adversarial image examples in DNNs.
However, the prior knowledge of attack techniques or the
modification to the target model is often required. This
paper presents a straightforward and effective adversarial
image examples detection method. The adversarial pertur-
bations are regarded as a kind of noise and the proposed
method is implemented as a filter to reduce their effect. The
image entropy is used to automatically adjust the detection
strategy for specific samples. Our method provides two
important features (1) without requiring the prior knowl-
edge about attacks and (2) can be directly integrated into
unmodified models.
We evaluate our method in both defense-unaware and
defense-aware scenario. The experiments show that our
method can achieve a high F1 score in detecting the adver-
sarial examples generated by the different attack techniques
and targeting different models in the defense-unaware sce-
nario, and can effectively raise the bar for adversaries in the
defense-aware scenario. Compared with existing detection
methods, our method can perform better in both the two
attack scenarios. Note that our method is also compatible
with other defense techniques. A better performance can be
achieved by combining them together.
Our research demonstrates that the adversarial images
can be effectively analyzed with classic image processing
techniques. In the future, we will investigate more image
processing techniques to find more effective and practicable
detection techniques, especially for defense-aware attacks.
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